More Misleading Claims from Thum Ping Tjin

Thum Ping Tjin has recently made a startling assertion that after his works were published, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) “no longer say that they have evidence that the detainees of Operation Coldstore were involved in a communist conspiracy”. He claims this is a “major shift in position” and proves that MHA “also accept my sources are accurate and legitimate”.




The Government has quite understandably ignored Thum’s erroneous claims probably because it believes the public is discerning enough not to be misled by his singular desire to spin his own version of history. Still, it is important to set the record straight in case such unsubstantiated claims gain acceptance by default because no one rebutted them.




A quick recount of some of the evidence and facts would be in order to debunk Thum’s absurd claims. The Government has stated, as recently as 14 Dec 2014, that “[a] full reading of the declassified documents from the British National Archives shows clearly that Operation Coldstore was a security operation meant to counter the serious security threat posed by the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and their supporters in Singapore, working through the Barisan and associated communist united front (CUF) organisations”. The Government stated that revisionists like Thum “conveniently omit mention of the incriminating information in these documents” by quoting documents “selectively”. British officials as well as CPM leaders have acknowledged that the Barisan was “the prime CUF body in Singapore in the 1960s, influenced, directed and led by CPM cadres”.




In this and another reply dated 20 Jan this year, the Government revealed among other things, the CPM strategy to capture political power in Singapore and use Singapore as a base to establish communist rule in the whole of Malaya, the formation of Barisan on the explicit instructions of the CPM, the CPM control of trade unions and other mass organisations, the communist antecedents of Barisan leaders, the discussions about armed struggle by Barisan cadres, Barisan’s support for the Brunei revolt in Dec 1962, and CPM’s decision in Beijing to prevent the formation of Malaysia and instructions to its proxies in Singapore.




In addition to the Government’s replies, I would add a Cold War dimension to the CPM’s strategy and highlight the Communists’ grand design in Southeast Asia. Chin Peng, the CPM’s Secretary-General, wrote in his memoirs that in July 1961, he and two other CPM leaders met Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Deng Xiaoping who informed them that Southeast Asia “was about to undergo monumental changes”. Deng said that “Strategically, the whole region … would become ripe for the sort of struggle we had been pursuing in Malaya for so long. The CPM must not…switch policies at this point. We must take advantage of the opportunities that would soon be presenting themselves throughout South East Asia”. Basically, Deng persuaded Chin Peng to persist with their armed struggle as this was going to happen in a big way in the region. Chin Peng further revealed that the CCP provided the CPM with financial support, training, a headquarters in Beijing and other amenities.




Clearly, the overall communist plan in the early 1960s was to turn Southeast Asia red, starting with Indochina in the north and Sukarno’s Indonesia in the south. As communist forces mounted attacks in Indochina, Sukarno, launched ‘konfrontasi’ against Malaysia on 20 Jan 1963 (two weeks before Operation Coldstore), starting with harassment of fishing boats and escalating to armed incursions and bombings by mid-1963. A month before ‘konfrontasi’ was launched, Brunei rebels staged a revolt. The Indonesian communist party (PKI) called for full support for the rebellion and urged the Government to make it a success. Sukarno and the Indonesian Parliament declared its support and so too did the Barisan and Partai Rakyat (PR) in Singapore. The Barisan and PR held rallies and discuss plans to whip up support for the rebellion and recruit volunteers from Singapore to fight alongside the Brunei rebels. The communists and their proxies in Singapore hoped that these external forces would prevent the formation of Malaysia. Before they could do more trouble, Operation Coldstore was launched and they were arrested and the threat averted. Chin Peng admitted that Operation Coldstore “shattered our underground network throughout the island”.





This geopolitical backdrop showing communist violence and plans during the period in the region augment earlier government replies about the CPM conspiracy and Operation Coldstore. Thum’s disregard of the overwhelming evidence that justified Operation Coldstore confirm that he is not interested in historical truths but politics. He has declared that “it is the responsibility of academics to critique power, those in power, and how power is used”. In attempting to do so, Thum has put forth a version of history that is seriously flawed and statements that are erroneous.

Another Misleading Account by Thum Ping Tjin

After being thoroughly exposed for his one-sided and erroneous account of Operation Coldstore (1963), Thum and his close supporter Loh - others seem to have withdrawn support after realizing the lack of academic rigour in Thum's works - have now moved into the 1950s to look for safer areas to push their revisionist line.  In their latest article, Thum and Loh again take the position that there was no communist threat, no communist subversion and no communist united front.  In other words, the British, Labour Front Chief Ministers David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock (1955-1959), Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Cabinet ministers, hundreds of government officials and diplomats and the many local and foreign scholars who have written extensively on the communist threat since the 1950s have all got it wrong? There was no communist threat? 

Unfortunately for Thum and Loh, the CPM leaders themselves have let the cat out of the bag.  CPM Secretary General Chin Peng himself had stated in his memoirs (2003) that the CPM controlled the left-wing trade union movement in the 1950s.  Fong Chong Pik aka the Plen, who was in charge of CPM operations in Singapore, had revealed in his memoirs (2008) about the conspiracies hatched by the CPM secret working committee in Jakarta, and his dealings with top trade union and political leaders and activists in Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s.  CPM members in Hong Kong and China have revealed in their 2013 book that they were behind the unrest in the 1950s, including the Hock Lee Bus riots.  No wonder Thum and Loh ignore these more recent works in their article as they completely demolish their claims that there was no communist threat or conspiracies in Singapore. 

Both writers blame the management and the police for the Hock Lee Bus riots that broke out in 1955 and exonerated the communists and their open front leader Lim Chin Siong and his close confidante Fong Swee Suan.  As in Thum's flawed account of Operation Coldstore, this version of the Hock Lee Bus riots is equally defective, with significant omissions and simplistic one-sided narrative.  

They conveniently fail to mention that Chief Minister David Marshall had denounced the strikers and rioters in his radio broadcast on the day of the riots (12 May 1955), saying that the pattern of developments today closely conforms to the Communist technique in seeking to foment industrial unrest on any excuse and to obstruct peaceful solutions - a strong indictment of the communists and their united front leaders by Marshall which was published in The Straits Times the next day and which Thum and Loh conveniently ignore.

In the Legislative Assembly debate that ensued, Marshall demanded that Lim Chin Siong declare publicly whether he spoke in the Chamber as a "communist and a fellow sympathiser of the Communists". Chief Secretary William Goode also accused both Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan of instigating the use of violence. The CPM itself, through its propaganda organ, Freedom News, celebrated the victorious ending of the Hock Lee incident and declared that "[an] economic struggle has been precipitated into becoming a political struggle".

It did not fail to draw a link between the "expansion of the workers" movement and the expansion of the national liberation war? it was waging.  There are many other quotes that can be cited to thoroughly demolish the claims in their joint article.  There is no question about the communist threat or communist involvement in the strike and riots that followed.

The only reason Thum and Loh persist in their misrepresentation of historical facts is probably because this approach fits well with their political agenda to undermine public confidence and trust in the present Government which had continued the anti-communist policy of the Labour Front Government (1955-1959) after it took over power in 1959.

If history is to move us forward, it has to be depoliticised from the meandering antics of revisionist historians, such as Thum and Loh, who seek to weave their current political aspirations into their historical analysis. Similarly, pro-establishment historians have to resist against pressure that call for no change, for the study of Singapore's history to remain at status quo. There hasn't been enough in-depth study of Singapore's history from 1950s to 1970s and what I see currently isn't doing us any good.  

PJ Thum repeats old claims as historical truth remains elusive

Thum Pingtjin responded to Burhan Gafoor's letter with a FB posting that he is “happy that the government is engaging with my work”; he claims that his article on Coldstore “which was peer-reviewed and has extensive citations, does address the issues and evidence that Burhan raises”.

Thum's article does nothing of the sort. It fails to include several important revelations by Chin Peng, Fong Chong Pik aka The Plan, Eu Chooi Yip and other CPM/ABL leaders and activists that demolishes his arguments. Eu's revelations that the Barisan was formed on the instruction of The Plen completely undermines his whole thesis that the Barisan was just an ordinary left-wing political party instead of being the principal communist united front organisation (CUF) in Singapore that it was. His allegation that the CUF was an “invention” by the authorities has now been proven to be false.

Click here to read earlier article on what Chin Peng and The Plen say in their own memoirs. 

In another article which also touched on Coldstore and merger, Thum declares that his work quoted extensively the Chinese press – did he know that The Plen has written in his book that many of the articles in the Chinese press originated from him?

Many of these revelations have been in the public domain for the last 15 years. His entire unsubstantiated case against the government over Coldstore collapses now that it has been proven that the Barisan was indeed a political front of the CPM and that the communists were actively driving Barisan's disruptive activities and that the communists conspiracy was real and not imagined as alleged. Will Thum now revise his article?

Thum's response to Burhan was a repetition of his old line that his article was “peer reviewed” as though that in itself authenticates his work as a truthful account and addresses all concerns about inaccuracies and misrepresentations. Since he relies heavily on peer reviews, and give the many misleading arguments in his article, readers are entitled to know who are these peers who reviewed his work and how were they chosen? What are their areas of specialisation and research interests? How familiar are they with Communism in Southeast Asia, in particular Malaya and Singapore? How familiar are they with Singapore history? Have they conducted research on Singapore history and politics?

Further, would Thum address all the evidence and arguments highlighted in Burhan's reply in his forthcoming works on Coldstore or is it going to be an expanded version of his flawed articles? In particular, would he include all the revelations by Chin Peng, The Plen, Eu Chooi Yip and former CPM/ABL members that contradict his thesis? Would he also include the revelations and exhaustive research conducted by authors like C C Chin, Cheah Boon Kheng, Lee Ting Hui, Drysdale and Bloodworth and other British colonial records that argue against his own arguments?

Like Thum, I too hope that the state would declassify more documents. But when academics do not use materials that are publicly available and shoddily analyse those that they have access to, then I wonder when that day will come.  

From London with Love

Two perhaps questionable moves by Tan Jee Say in his early efforts to gather public support for his next run for office -- one is to rely on the widely circulated but maybe questionable research findings of a relatively new professor (Thum Ping Tjin). The other is to parrot what this fresh researcher wrote and said without due diligence of his own, like cross-checking with other historians and sources.


Having recently retired and now splitting my free time between Singapore and London, researching into the social history of Singapore, let me cite just 4 reasons why both Tan and Thum might not get a reply the government:


Firstly, unknown to many non-historians and members of the public, Thum has given a simplistic account of the communist threat and Operation Coldstore in his talks and articles. Thum has ignored several colonial dispatches and Internal Security Council (ISC) minutes that clearly showed the existence of a serious communist threat. Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore and his deputy, Philip Moore, were concerned about the communist threat and had advocated firm action as early as 1960. See for example these extracts from the British archives:



In a May 1960 ISC meeting, Lord Selkirk:

“…expressed his appreciation of the skilful way in which the Singapore Government were trying to deal with the problem of subversion in the trade unions, but said that it was obviously necessary to keep a careful watch on any pressure building up to subvert the TUC [Trade Union Congress].” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 9th Meeting, 19 May 1960 (para 4)










Later, during another ISC meeting in October 1960, Selkirk commented that the Singapore Government:

“…was faced here by a challenge against the democratic system over the whole of Malaya. To a large extent this challenge was now being made through the trade unions in Singapore. The Government could not allow itself to be knocked about by the Communists acting through the trade unions. The strength of the Government's case was that these people were pressing the Communist cause by subversive methods. By sticking to its line, the Government would emerge stronger in the end. It should not, therefore, be deterred by fears of any temporary unpopularity.” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 14th Meeting, 7 Oct 1960 (para 8)








Second, whatever reservations Selkirk or his deputy Philip Moore might have had about arresting the communists, they later became fully convinced of the need for security action when more evidence emerged about communist control of the political party Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS), the discussion BSS leaders had about the question of armed struggle, and when the BSS came out in support of the armed rebellion in Brunei. On 7 December 1962, a day before the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion, Moore wrote:


“I enclose copies of reports which came to us last month from a reliable and well placed source on two meetings held at the headquarters of the Barisan Sosialis last September. These reports are of considerable importance, not only for what they reveal of the future intentions of Barisan Sosialis, but they provide more conclusive evidence than we have had hitherto for the belief that Barisan Sosialis are Communist controlled…It has never been disputed that the Communists in Singapore are following United Front tactics and that Barisan Sosialis is their principal instrument on the political front…The report on the first of the two meetings shows that those engaging in the discussion were Communists examining quite frankly how best to achieve their ends. Furthermore, we can see that the Communist influence within Barisan Sosialis is not confined to the Central Executive Committee but extends to Branch Committee level…”. CO 1030/1160, Moore to Wallace, 7 Dec 1962 (paras 1 and 2)








A week later, on 14 December 1962, after the Brunei rebellion, Lord Selkirk sent a dispatch to Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

“I said I had recognised all along that a threat was presented by the communists in Singapore. I had not however previously been convinced that a large number of arrests was necessary to counter this threat. Recently, however, new evidence had been produced about the extent of the communist control of the Barisan Sosialis and also there had been indications that the communists might resort to violence if the opportunity occurred. Recent statements by the Barisan Sosialis and Party Rakyat supporting the revolt in Brunei confirmed this. Accordingly H.M.G. [Her Majesty’s Government] were prepared to see [arrest] action taken in Singapore…”. CO 1030/1160, Selkirk to SSC, Tel. 582, 14 Dec 1962 (para 5)







Third, the above British declassified documents show that it is a big folly to read the MI5 report in isolation. Thum Ping Tjin and then Tan Jee Say have brandished the MI5 report without realizing that it should be read in the context of active and robust discussions about the extent of the communist threat. Thum is seized by the MI5 report without considering its context and taking into consideration the totality of evidence. I do hope that Tan Jee Say will reconsider his position, because as a opposition politician and he shouldn't bet so many eggs in this basket.


Fourth, what Thum (and Tan) fail to realize is that the MI5 report by the British SLO Maurice Williams was not the norm, and it is a gross error of judgment for a historian, even if new, to rely heavily on such a report to make momentous conclusions. Revelations from many sources, including CPM sources, confirmed without a shadow of a doubt, the existence of a communist conspiracy and the communist united front. CPM chief Chin Peng and the Plen had revealed in their books about sabotaging PAP’s plans for merger and Malaysia. The Plen had revealed how he had used the Chinese press to disseminate his opposing views. He also revealed how he had had secret meetings in Jakarta to lead the united front in Singapore and target the PAP for subversion, how he had ordered a top CPM cadre in the Workers Party to resign, and how he had ordered all support for Partai Rakyat to be withdrawn during the 1959 General Election. Chin Peng in turn had disclosed how Deng Xiaoping had ‘advised’ him in July 1961 in Beijing to continue with the armed struggle and how he accepted the ‘advice’ and Deng’s offer of financial help. These are just some facts that clearly contradict the claims by Thum, Tan and others that there was “no evidence” of a communist conspiracy.


Bottomline for all interested readers is this -- we should read new interpretations of history with a curious mind and not take everything at face value. As a Singaporean who has been a long time working resident of London, I will say that the British public is also somewhat skeptical of the British archives because one might never know if ALL documents were declassified or if officials writing the reports have other motivations. Nevertheless, Singaporeans should never forget our own history because if we do, then Singapore would really become just a place for people to make money!