Francis Seow: A brilliant lawyer but the leader that never was

On 21 Jan 2016 we say our last goodbye to a political icon of the 60s to 80s, Francis Seow. Once regarded as the most brilliant lawyer for the Singapore government and later a formidable political opposition, what really fulled his actions? Was it his unflinching passion for democracy and freedom? Was he driven to desperation by the Singapore government? Or something else? 

When Francis Seow was working for the Government for over 10 years as senior counsel and later as Solicitor-General, and enjoyed all the prestige and privileges that came with his office, he had no complaints against the Government and was in fact very supportive of its various actions, including those against the communists and their supporters. 

Seow played a crucial role in exposing the communists in Singapore and contributed to the defeat of communist united front leader Lim Chin Siong and his pro-communist Barisan Sosialis at the September 1962 Referendum on merger with Malaysia. 

Seow was a senior counsel during the Commission of Inquiry into the 1961 Secondary IV examination boycott by Chinese students orchestrated by the communists. During the COI in 1962, Seow presented strong convincing evidence that Lim Chin Siong was a communist and headed an underground communist cell. Seow was awarded the Public Administration (Gold) Medal for his contributions and rose to become the Solicitor-General in 1969. 

However, after he left the Legal Service to go into private practice in 1972, he turned sour and changed his attitude towards the Government to the extent that by the mid-1980s he openly attacked the government he had served avidly for a decade. Investigations revealed that Seow, fulled by his desire for political power, had colluded with American officials to lead a group of professionals including lawyers into opposition politics. 

He had apparently cultivated the Americans to support his political plans and to provide him with asylum should it become necessary. The Americans supported him and gave the impression that asylum would be forthcoming when needed. By doing so, Seow became beholden to the Americans. He had made himself a willing party to interference in Singapore's domestic affairs by foreign officials. 

Seow was detained briefly under the ISA and following his release, he contested in the 1988 GE as a WP member for Eunos GRC, losing only narrowly by 1279 votes. During his trial for income tax evasion after the elections, Seow duly sought and was granted asylum in the US. In his sworn affidavit, Seow admitted that he had been to Washington before the elections to meet high-level State Department officials where they assured him of refuge status should he run into trouble with the Singapore government. 

Seow's close friend and fellow activist in Law Society, Subhas Anandan, who supported Seow of the President of Law Society, found out too late about Seow's duplicitous character and questionable character. Subhas wrote in his book: 

“ (Seow) were fulled by deep-seated motives or what one would consider personal desires. Whatever his motives may have been, the way he conducted himself as president and the speeches he made had lawyers walking with their heads held up high. We had the feeling that we would not be trampled upon. We had a leader who would stand by us. Little did we know that the same leader would someday pack up his things and slink away from Singapore leaving behind a lot of disillusioned people who believed in him. There were also those who gave him money. He still owes me $25,000..." 

“(Seow) was a disappointment and a disaster. He didn’t have the moral courage to return to Singapore to face income tax charges even if he was convicted of those charges, it would have only amounted to a fine but he was not prepared to take the risk. In the final analysis, he was after all, nothing. A man who spoke well – his eloquence was often very charming – but other than that he did not have what it took to be a leader.”

More Misleading Claims from Thum Ping Tjin

Thum Ping Tjin has recently made a startling assertion that after his works were published, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) “no longer say that they have evidence that the detainees of Operation Coldstore were involved in a communist conspiracy”. He claims this is a “major shift in position” and proves that MHA “also accept my sources are accurate and legitimate”.




The Government has quite understandably ignored Thum’s erroneous claims probably because it believes the public is discerning enough not to be misled by his singular desire to spin his own version of history. Still, it is important to set the record straight in case such unsubstantiated claims gain acceptance by default because no one rebutted them.




A quick recount of some of the evidence and facts would be in order to debunk Thum’s absurd claims. The Government has stated, as recently as 14 Dec 2014, that “[a] full reading of the declassified documents from the British National Archives shows clearly that Operation Coldstore was a security operation meant to counter the serious security threat posed by the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and their supporters in Singapore, working through the Barisan and associated communist united front (CUF) organisations”. The Government stated that revisionists like Thum “conveniently omit mention of the incriminating information in these documents” by quoting documents “selectively”. British officials as well as CPM leaders have acknowledged that the Barisan was “the prime CUF body in Singapore in the 1960s, influenced, directed and led by CPM cadres”.




In this and another reply dated 20 Jan this year, the Government revealed among other things, the CPM strategy to capture political power in Singapore and use Singapore as a base to establish communist rule in the whole of Malaya, the formation of Barisan on the explicit instructions of the CPM, the CPM control of trade unions and other mass organisations, the communist antecedents of Barisan leaders, the discussions about armed struggle by Barisan cadres, Barisan’s support for the Brunei revolt in Dec 1962, and CPM’s decision in Beijing to prevent the formation of Malaysia and instructions to its proxies in Singapore.




In addition to the Government’s replies, I would add a Cold War dimension to the CPM’s strategy and highlight the Communists’ grand design in Southeast Asia. Chin Peng, the CPM’s Secretary-General, wrote in his memoirs that in July 1961, he and two other CPM leaders met Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Deng Xiaoping who informed them that Southeast Asia “was about to undergo monumental changes”. Deng said that “Strategically, the whole region … would become ripe for the sort of struggle we had been pursuing in Malaya for so long. The CPM must not…switch policies at this point. We must take advantage of the opportunities that would soon be presenting themselves throughout South East Asia”. Basically, Deng persuaded Chin Peng to persist with their armed struggle as this was going to happen in a big way in the region. Chin Peng further revealed that the CCP provided the CPM with financial support, training, a headquarters in Beijing and other amenities.




Clearly, the overall communist plan in the early 1960s was to turn Southeast Asia red, starting with Indochina in the north and Sukarno’s Indonesia in the south. As communist forces mounted attacks in Indochina, Sukarno, launched ‘konfrontasi’ against Malaysia on 20 Jan 1963 (two weeks before Operation Coldstore), starting with harassment of fishing boats and escalating to armed incursions and bombings by mid-1963. A month before ‘konfrontasi’ was launched, Brunei rebels staged a revolt. The Indonesian communist party (PKI) called for full support for the rebellion and urged the Government to make it a success. Sukarno and the Indonesian Parliament declared its support and so too did the Barisan and Partai Rakyat (PR) in Singapore. The Barisan and PR held rallies and discuss plans to whip up support for the rebellion and recruit volunteers from Singapore to fight alongside the Brunei rebels. The communists and their proxies in Singapore hoped that these external forces would prevent the formation of Malaysia. Before they could do more trouble, Operation Coldstore was launched and they were arrested and the threat averted. Chin Peng admitted that Operation Coldstore “shattered our underground network throughout the island”.





This geopolitical backdrop showing communist violence and plans during the period in the region augment earlier government replies about the CPM conspiracy and Operation Coldstore. Thum’s disregard of the overwhelming evidence that justified Operation Coldstore confirm that he is not interested in historical truths but politics. He has declared that “it is the responsibility of academics to critique power, those in power, and how power is used”. In attempting to do so, Thum has put forth a version of history that is seriously flawed and statements that are erroneous.

The 1974 Katong Bomb

It was just 6 am on Friday, 20 December 1974, when residents of Katong woke up to a mighty explosion. A bomb carried by the front seat passenger on his lap prematurely exploded as the car travelling down Still Road was just about to reach the junction with East Coast Road. It instantly killed the passenger, a Malaysian and ripped him open. The blast threw out the driver, a driver on to the road and he was eventually to die in hospital despite surgery. The driver an old boy of Chung Cheng High School was then an active member of Barisan Socialis. A third man seat in the back seat limped away and escaped. 3 other bombs were also discovered amidst the wreckage. Also found were flyers of Communist Party of Malaysia satellite organisations Malaysian National Liberation Front and the Malaysan Communist Youth League.

The trio were on their way not to light up the Christmas Tree at Katong Holy Church but to bomb the owner of Nanyang Shoe Factory located in JB at his residence in East Coast. The owner and his workers were in the midst of an industrial strife. 

On Sunday, 22nd December at the stroke of midnight, Dr Poh Soo Kai and his wife Grace left their home in their Toyota Corolla and headed North. A friend called G Raman, a lawyer in private practice and fellow traveler followed them in his car, a Volvo. They crossed the Causeway and headed for a Jetty in Masai near Pasir Gudang. The waited a while in the dead of the night, a boat with 2 males crossed over from Singapore. One of them was 3rd man from the car and he was injured. They were driven quite a distance to an isolated wooden house where the injured man was treated. 

The lawyer took leave as he was due in Court in a few hours time to defend one client who was being tried in court for rioting with two other defendants. He was originally asked to defend two of them but the main defendant by the name of Tan Wah Piow chose to conduct his defence. 

Within a year, the lawyer went on to hire a young female lawyer called Teo Soh Lung for his practice. 

Since Singapore's history began, there were 3 main incidents involving detention without trail. First was Operation Coldstore in 1963, the Euro Communists arrests in 1977 and Operations Spectrum - the Marxist Conspiracy in 1987. Dr Poh was one of the stars of the first incident in 63, G Raman was main protagonist in the second in 77 and Teo Soh Lung in the third in 87. Note the link involving 3 individuals over a span of 25 years.

Take Dr Poh Soo Kai for example. He was born with a silver spoon, a member of OCBC's Lee Kong Chian clan, did not have to work a day and could have lived a life of luxury. His first loves was English literature and poetry. When he began his medical studies at University of Singapore, he leaned towards the common man felt strongly about looking after the downtrodden and the exploited. He became a member of the Univeristy Socialist Club and became editor of Fajar. The British arrested the lot and charged them in court for sedition. A young Singapore Lawyer from Cambridge arranged for their defence and they were acquitted. Poh Soo Kai was in someone's basement in Oxley putting together flyer for the Owner's electoral debut. 

These are men of conviction, resolve and not out to make money. They wanted to save those who could not help themselves. They preferred a classless society. The was only one issue. The means to the end was not limited.

Scroobal 

Source: http://www.sammyboy.com/showthread.php?102046-Katong-Bomb-1974-Know-You-History 

The body of the dead saboteur being examined by the late pathologist Professor Chao Tzee Cheng.

History for history's sake?

Revisionists and their supporters are clearly distressed by the wide publicity on the communist threat in the early 1960s, as a result of the re-launching of the Battle for Merger. They do not seem to want the public to be reminded about the global Cold War or communist subversion in Singapore and insurrections in Southeast Asia.

To counter the publicity and mainstream narrative about the communist threat, Hong Lysa cites the dated work of Tim Harper and echoes the claim that there "is no evidence" of instructions from communist China or the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) to the communists in Singapore. She cites British Deputy Commissioner Philip Moore as saying in a dispatch that "while we accept that Lim Chin Siong is a communist, there is no evidence he is receiving orders from the CPM, Peking or Moscow."

But Moore's claim has been established to be inaccurate. It is roundly contradicted by revelations from the Secretary General of the CPM himself, Chin Peng. In his book published in 2003, Chin Peng revealed that in a meeting in July 1961 in Beijing, Deng Xiao Ping told him that he wanted the CPM to continue its armed struggle; Chin Peng agreed and accepted Deng's offer of financial support. (If anyone is interested, Chin Peng actually made a dangerous overland route from south Thailand to communist-controlled Hanoi, before boarding a plane to Peking.) Further, at the meeting in Beijing in 1961, Chin Peng instructed Eu Chooi Yip, the chief CPM strategist running operations in Singapore from Jakarta, to "sabotage" merger and Malaysia.

Picture from Chin Peng: My side of history

Picture from Chin Peng: My side of history

Fong Chong Pik aka the Plen has confirmed the instruction Chin Peng gave to Eu Chooi Yip. The Plen disclosed in his book published in 2008 and also to historian CC Chin that in a meeting in Beijing in 1957, the CPM had directed Eu to set up a working committee in Jakarta to strengthen and consolidate communist united front activities in Singapore. He was assigned this task, with further instructions to rebuild the united front with the PAP. One of his priorities was to meet Lee Kuan Yew in order to coordinate the policies and activities between PAP and the left-wing movement. On the merger issue, the Plen even revealed that he had used the local Chinese press to disseminate CPM's lines to influence the Chinese-speaking community.

There above should suffice to debunk Hong Lysa's and Moore's claims that there "is no evidence" of instructions from communist China or the CPM in Beijing to the communists in charge of running operations in Singapore. (As for Harper's dated article which Hong Lysa lauded, it was published in 2001 well before Chin Peng's and Fong's memoirs.)

The question arises as to why the revisionists have chosen to ignore the remarkable admissions of the communist leaders. Why do they instead grasp at a dated official document (Moore's) with an assessment that has been proven to be patently wrong at the time it was written? Moore himself later effectively conceded in another dispatch to the Colonial Office dated 7 December 1962 that he was mistaken! He wrote that the "communists (in Barisan Sosialis) seem to be sufficiently entrenched to control policy and action." The revisionists failed to mention this reversal of opinion and re-assessment of the communist threat in Singapore.

The explanation for the revisionists' selective use of documents and sources boils down to the fact that they are less keen in establishing historical truths and more interested in being the vanguard of fashionable counter-theories. Together with like-minded persons, they sought to show that there was no justification for Operation Coldstore, and to use this as a pretext to join the bandwagon of opposition politics. This is not history but politics.

From London with Love

Two perhaps questionable moves by Tan Jee Say in his early efforts to gather public support for his next run for office -- one is to rely on the widely circulated but maybe questionable research findings of a relatively new professor (Thum Ping Tjin). The other is to parrot what this fresh researcher wrote and said without due diligence of his own, like cross-checking with other historians and sources.


Having recently retired and now splitting my free time between Singapore and London, researching into the social history of Singapore, let me cite just 4 reasons why both Tan and Thum might not get a reply the government:


Firstly, unknown to many non-historians and members of the public, Thum has given a simplistic account of the communist threat and Operation Coldstore in his talks and articles. Thum has ignored several colonial dispatches and Internal Security Council (ISC) minutes that clearly showed the existence of a serious communist threat. Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore and his deputy, Philip Moore, were concerned about the communist threat and had advocated firm action as early as 1960. See for example these extracts from the British archives:



In a May 1960 ISC meeting, Lord Selkirk:

“…expressed his appreciation of the skilful way in which the Singapore Government were trying to deal with the problem of subversion in the trade unions, but said that it was obviously necessary to keep a careful watch on any pressure building up to subvert the TUC [Trade Union Congress].” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 9th Meeting, 19 May 1960 (para 4)










Later, during another ISC meeting in October 1960, Selkirk commented that the Singapore Government:

“…was faced here by a challenge against the democratic system over the whole of Malaya. To a large extent this challenge was now being made through the trade unions in Singapore. The Government could not allow itself to be knocked about by the Communists acting through the trade unions. The strength of the Government's case was that these people were pressing the Communist cause by subversive methods. By sticking to its line, the Government would emerge stronger in the end. It should not, therefore, be deterred by fears of any temporary unpopularity.” ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 14th Meeting, 7 Oct 1960 (para 8)








Second, whatever reservations Selkirk or his deputy Philip Moore might have had about arresting the communists, they later became fully convinced of the need for security action when more evidence emerged about communist control of the political party Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS), the discussion BSS leaders had about the question of armed struggle, and when the BSS came out in support of the armed rebellion in Brunei. On 7 December 1962, a day before the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion, Moore wrote:


“I enclose copies of reports which came to us last month from a reliable and well placed source on two meetings held at the headquarters of the Barisan Sosialis last September. These reports are of considerable importance, not only for what they reveal of the future intentions of Barisan Sosialis, but they provide more conclusive evidence than we have had hitherto for the belief that Barisan Sosialis are Communist controlled…It has never been disputed that the Communists in Singapore are following United Front tactics and that Barisan Sosialis is their principal instrument on the political front…The report on the first of the two meetings shows that those engaging in the discussion were Communists examining quite frankly how best to achieve their ends. Furthermore, we can see that the Communist influence within Barisan Sosialis is not confined to the Central Executive Committee but extends to Branch Committee level…”. CO 1030/1160, Moore to Wallace, 7 Dec 1962 (paras 1 and 2)








A week later, on 14 December 1962, after the Brunei rebellion, Lord Selkirk sent a dispatch to Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

“I said I had recognised all along that a threat was presented by the communists in Singapore. I had not however previously been convinced that a large number of arrests was necessary to counter this threat. Recently, however, new evidence had been produced about the extent of the communist control of the Barisan Sosialis and also there had been indications that the communists might resort to violence if the opportunity occurred. Recent statements by the Barisan Sosialis and Party Rakyat supporting the revolt in Brunei confirmed this. Accordingly H.M.G. [Her Majesty’s Government] were prepared to see [arrest] action taken in Singapore…”. CO 1030/1160, Selkirk to SSC, Tel. 582, 14 Dec 1962 (para 5)







Third, the above British declassified documents show that it is a big folly to read the MI5 report in isolation. Thum Ping Tjin and then Tan Jee Say have brandished the MI5 report without realizing that it should be read in the context of active and robust discussions about the extent of the communist threat. Thum is seized by the MI5 report without considering its context and taking into consideration the totality of evidence. I do hope that Tan Jee Say will reconsider his position, because as a opposition politician and he shouldn't bet so many eggs in this basket.


Fourth, what Thum (and Tan) fail to realize is that the MI5 report by the British SLO Maurice Williams was not the norm, and it is a gross error of judgment for a historian, even if new, to rely heavily on such a report to make momentous conclusions. Revelations from many sources, including CPM sources, confirmed without a shadow of a doubt, the existence of a communist conspiracy and the communist united front. CPM chief Chin Peng and the Plen had revealed in their books about sabotaging PAP’s plans for merger and Malaysia. The Plen had revealed how he had used the Chinese press to disseminate his opposing views. He also revealed how he had had secret meetings in Jakarta to lead the united front in Singapore and target the PAP for subversion, how he had ordered a top CPM cadre in the Workers Party to resign, and how he had ordered all support for Partai Rakyat to be withdrawn during the 1959 General Election. Chin Peng in turn had disclosed how Deng Xiaoping had ‘advised’ him in July 1961 in Beijing to continue with the armed struggle and how he accepted the ‘advice’ and Deng’s offer of financial help. These are just some facts that clearly contradict the claims by Thum, Tan and others that there was “no evidence” of a communist conspiracy.


Bottomline for all interested readers is this -- we should read new interpretations of history with a curious mind and not take everything at face value. As a Singaporean who has been a long time working resident of London, I will say that the British public is also somewhat skeptical of the British archives because one might never know if ALL documents were declassified or if officials writing the reports have other motivations. Nevertheless, Singaporeans should never forget our own history because if we do, then Singapore would really become just a place for people to make money!